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The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society
Jadwiga Rogoża
In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, 
Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net 
is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of 
Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. 
The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, 
brought about significant political and social consequences. With the politi-
cal and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most 
of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alter-
native to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and 
a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school 
of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social 
and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election 
period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests.
The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian govern-
ment, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor 
civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments 
of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. 
This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected 
sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These 
actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging 
internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem fea-
sible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this 
activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to 
repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resent-
ment towards the government.
1. The Runet: its scale
The access to the internet in Russia is nowadays widespread, and its significance in people’s 
everyday lives enormous. In the last decade, the number of internet users has surged from 
3.1 million users in 2000 to 52-54 million daily users in early 2012 (nearly 40% of the 
population)1. The reason behind this is the rapid economic growth that Russia has noted 
since 2000, and the dynamic development of information and telecommunication technolo-
gies, which has made internet devices more available, connections faster, and costs lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 For details, 
see ComScore and 
Internet World Stats.
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Recent years have seen a rapid growth of wireless internet (via Wi-Fi and WiMax); today about 
a third of Russian users surf the net via wireless internet devices (smartphones, iPads etc.).
The Russian internet comprises about 100,000 websites, 4,000 of which are official-
ly registered at the Ministry of Communications as the ‘internet media’. Nevertheless, 
the Russian-speaking internet is not limited to the .ru domain; it also includes the (less 
popular) .su domain (the acronym refers to the USSR), Russian-language websites in the 
post-Soviet states, and those registered on international domains (.com, .org and other). 
In June 2008, a Cyrillic domain (.pф) was created. Russia’s most popular websites are 
search engines and social networks. The specific feature of the Runet is that its users 
prefer their national equivalents (the VKontakte social network and the Yandex search engine) 
to the global leaders such as Facebook and Google. The Runet’s leading sites are the afore-
mentioned Yandex and VKontakte, the Mail.ru portal, followed by Google.ru and Google.com, 
and the top ten is rounded off by the Livejournal.com blog service2. One of the most popular 
sites is YouTube, where Russians post their videos, including those concerning political and 
social affairs. The leading news websites are RIA Novosti, RBC.ru, Lenta.ru and Gazeta.ru3. 
Another website worth mentioning is the online infotainment television Dozhd (tvrain.ru), 
popular with the Russian middle class and available both on the internet (including smart-
phones) and on cable and satellite.
Most Russians use the internet for entertainment, contacts and information. In early 2011, 
the internet outstripped traditional paper press in terms of the number of people searching 
for information about Russia and the world4. Most of the Russian population (70%) still 
turns to television as their primary source 
of information, but this share is constant-
ly decreasing in favour of the internet. 
Currently the net is the main source of 
information for a quarter of the Russian 
public – the most dynamic, educated and 
affluent part of society5. A trend observed 
among internet users and the Russian 
intellectual elite is their openly negative at-
titude towards television, a medium con-
trolled by the government and offering low-quality commercial product. The representatives 
of the aforementioned groups openly declare that they do not watch television. Therefore, 
even though TV remains Russia’s most popular medium, it does not shape the opinions 
and moods of the most active and educated part of society.
2. An information alternative
The internet has long been a full-fledged mass medium, and its efficiency and pluralism 
make it an unrivalled source of information, especially when covering dynamic events and 
presenting diverse standpoints. Unlike traditional media (television, press, especially the 
high-circulation titles) which are controlled by the state, the internet allows for posting 
unselected and politically uncensored content. The Runet contains an entire spectrum 
of ideological and political standpoints: democratic, liberal, left-wing, leftist, anarchist, 
nationalist, pro-government, opposition and politically non-aligned. The leading online me-
dia (Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, RBC, Yandex and others), visited by millions of users daily, pur-
sue an independent information policy. Russia’s extensive blogosphere, apart from being 
a source of information and entertainment, is also a discussion forum and a tool for co-
ordinating civic initiatives. The top Russian bloggers who specialise in social and political 
issues have tens to hundreds of thousands of readers. The Runet’s most popular bloggers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 See http://maxonline.3dn.ru/
index/samye_populjarnye_saj-
ty_runeta/0-15
3 See http://www.alexa.com/
topsites/countries/R
4 Pew Research Center, see 
Gazeta.ru, 18 March 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 ‘Rossiyane zamenyayut 
televideniye internetom’, 
http://news.softportal.com/
nitem-11562.html
Russia’s most popular websites are 
search engines and social networks. 
However, Russian users prefer 
their national equivalents 
(VKontakte social network and Yandex 
search engine) to global leaders – 
Facebook and Google.
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are Rustem Agadamov (drugoi.livejournal.com, 74,000 registered readers, and a larger 
number unregistered), Alexei Navalny (navalny.livejournal.com, 67,000 registered readers), 
and the internet activist and commentator Anton Nosik (dolboeb.livejournal.com, 38,000 
registered readers). These numbers compare to or even exceed the circulation of many in-
fluential Russian newspapers (Nezavisimaya Gazeta has a daily print run of 40,000 copies, 
Vedomosti 75,000, and Kommersant 125,000).
One of the internet’s features – the principle of interactivity – has altered the relation-
ship between the state and society in terms of information exchange. Previously, society 
was a passive recipient of the information generated by the state and transmitted through 
the loyal media. The news were prepared by professional (and amenable) journalists; what-
ever did not appear on television, could not reach a wider audience and become nation-
al or even regional news. With the expansion of internet access and new technologies, 
especially mobile devices (smartphones), the Russian-language cyberspace has become 
a fully-fledged news generator. An increasing share of this news is provided by ordinary 
users, who become witnesses to interest-
ing events and can easily make them pub-
lic. Along with this process, the govern-
ment is gradually losing its monopoly on 
the creation of news and political mes-
sages on the national scale. As a result, 
much information critical of the govern-
ment is beginning to reach the public. 
The authors of these high-resonance re-
ports include frustrated state officials or employees of the institutions of force, who uncover 
various faults and shortcomings in the state institutions. One of the most notorious ‘whistle-
blowers’ was a police captain, Alexei Dymovsky, who in 2009 in a series of videos posted 
on YouTube revealed the in corruption, nepotism, the ruthlessness of his superiors, law-
breaking by senior officials (tampering with statistics, drug trafficking) which were prevalent 
in the Interior Ministry. In this way, the internet has gradually become an alternative source 
of information and a tool for social control of the government’s activities at all levels.
The decentralisation of the information process has strengthened social control of 
the government, one example of which is the public’s changing approach to law-breaking 
by the political and business elite. One of the most notorious problems in Russia is the 
road accidents caused by VIPs who drive cars equipped with special signs of privilege 
(such as the detachable flashing blue lights called migalka in Russian) and frequently violate 
traffic regulations. Formerly, such cases were rarely publicised or were hushed up (such as 
a little-known fact that in 1997, the then chauffeur of Vladimir Putin, who at the time was 
an official of the Presidential Administration, struck and fatally injured a child). In subse-
quent years, such news reached a rather narrow circle of internet users and readers of the 
opposition press (such as the accident caused in 2005 by the son of Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergey Ivanov, who knocked down and killed an elderly woman on a pedestrian crossing). 
Now the situation has changed completely. It is almost impossible to hush such accidents 
up – witnesses publicise them on the internet, the information reaches a wide audience and 
often causes an indignant public response. In cases of a gross violation of the law, internet 
users have been able to initiate an investigation and alter the course, and even the outcome, 
of the proceedings6.
 
 
 
 
 
6 An example from 2010 
is the accident in Moscow 
caused by Anatoly Barkov, 
a vice-president 
of the Lukoil corporation.
The internet has become 
an alternative to the government- 
-controlled media, and has 
undermined the state’s monopoly 
on the creation of nationwide news 
and political messages.
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3. A prosthesis to democracy
As the internet expanded, it became a home to the political and civic activity which was 
encountering difficulties in the ‘real world’ because of the government’s control over 
the social and political sphere. This control made it difficult or even impossible to register 
a political party, establish an NGO, or obtain civil rights in court. In cyberspace, most of this 
‘unauthorised’ activity has been conducted successfully. The internet has become not only 
a source of information, but also a tool of social consolidation and coordination. Online 
communities bound by common views and interests act as substitutes for political parties, 
and the blogosphere has become a public forum for exchanging information and opinions. 
Civil investigations have gained momentum, and political satire, which has been absent from 
the traditional media for years, flourishes in the internet. The net has become a bridgehead 
for the political opposition, which is reaching potential supporters via social networks and 
blogs, and also organising various actions, both virtual and conducted in the ‘real world’.
In addition to activities related to politics, the internet is a site for various non-political ini-
tiatives, connected to charities, consumer protection, civil rights, culture and other issues. 
Many such initiatives have gained prominence and support on the national level and have 
motivated other citizens, who faced similar problems elsewhere. These initiatives, initiated 
and successfully completed thanks to the Runet, have proved conducive to the develop-
ment of attitudes characteristic of democratic societies: the development of grass-roots 
initiatives, groups consolidating to defend common interests, and seeking to improve the 
people’s legal awareness and education. This has helped overcome attitudes entrenched 
in Russian society – inaction, atomisation and low legal awareness – that had made the 
general public susceptible to the govern-
ment’s manipulation. Thus, the internet 
has become a major counter-tool against 
the government’s political and social 
strategy, and this activity in cyberspace 
has become a forerunner and encourage-
ment of such activity in the ‘real world’.
One of the Runet’s most remarkable phe-
nomena in recent years has been the ac-
tivity of the well-known blogger and lawyer 
Alexei Navalny, and especially the RosPil 
institution (rospil.info) which he founded. 
The aim of RosPil is to fight corruption: Navalny and the lawyers he has hired examine 
state tenders (also checking numerous reports sent by internet users) and initiate legal 
proceedings whenever these tenders raise suspicions of corruption. The whole documenta-
tion is published on their website. RosPil’s activity is financed entirely by contributions from 
internet users; this has set a precedent in Russia, where attitudes of distrust and disbelief 
in the efficiency of collective action had predominated (for more cases of civil initiatives in 
the Runet, see the Appendix).
The internet (especially social networks and blogs) played a key role in the organisation 
of demonstrations at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012, which gathered tens of 
thousands of people in Moscow and other Russian cities in protests against electoral fraud. 
The evidence of electoral machinations and comments on the course and outcome of the 
elections were published on the internet, and the coordination of the rallies (including fun-
draising) was likewise conducted online. The leaders of electoral protests included activists 
who gained prominence thanks to their internet activity: Alexey Navalny, the aforemen-
tioned creator of RosPil and RosVybory and Petr Shkumatov, the founder of the Blue Bucket 
Initiatives initiated and successfully 
carried out on the Runet have been 
conducive to the development 
of attitudes characteristic of demo-
cratic societies: the development 
of grass-roots initiatives, groups con-
solidating to defend common interests, 
and seeking to improve the people’s 
legal awareness and education.
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Movement (see Appendix). This confirms once again that the internet has become a school 
of civic activity for the Russian people.
4. Cyber-propaganda: the government goes online
The internet has also been used for years by the government as an increasingly popular 
information tool. All state and local government offices have their own websites, while 
blogging and tweeting is becoming increasingly popular among government officials. 
The internet became ‘trendy’ in the state administration after Dmitry Medvedev took office 
as president. He encouraged officials to communicate with voters online by his own example; 
he has a video blog on the Kremlin website and a Twitter account. One of Medvedev’s latest 
internet projects is a portal called ‘Russia without fools’ (rossiyabezdurakov.ru), which is an 
imitation of civic initiatives aimed at combating corruption and bureaucracy. Recently even 
Prime Minister Putin has referred to internet reports, even though he had earlier distanced 
himself from the net (rumour has it that the Prime Minister is not a computer user).
Russian-language cyberspace – including the blogosphere and social networks – is also 
home to pro-government activists, experts and commentators. Until recently, the main 
political coordinator of the pro-government activity online was Vladislav Surkov, the deputy 
head of the Presidential Administration 
(in December 2011 he was appointed 
deputy prime minister). One area of such 
activity is a ‘youth platform’ managed 
by Vasily Yakemenko, the coordinator of 
a pro-government youth organisation 
‘Nashi’ (Our Folk), and head of the govern-
ment agency for youth. This platform com-
prises a number of blogs by and profiles of members of youth organisations; one of the most active 
users therein is the ‘Nashi’ spokeswoman Kristina Potupchik (krispotupchik.livejournal.com). 
Another platform consists of pro-government infotainment websites created and coordi-
nated by Konstantin Rykov, currently an MP and a member of the United Russia party 
(his most popular sites include dni.ru, vzglyad.ru and infox.ru). A similar role is played 
by the blogs run by popular journalists and other public figures known for their support 
for the government, such as the TV presenter Tina Kandelaki (tikandelaki.livejournal.com) 
and the journalist Vladimir Solovyov (vsoloviev.livejournal.com).
The state’s internet resource base also includes websites that are either directly con-
trolled by the government or indirectly support it. The leading ones include the website 
of the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily and the state-owned news agency RIA Novosti7. 
Another is the popular multimedia portal LifeNews.Ru, which is controlled by Yuri Kovalchuk, 
an oligarch affiliated with Vladimir Putin. This tabloid-like portal specialises in leaks 
(publishing wiretapped conversations, etc.) that are aimed at discrediting the opposition. 
A similar role is played by online digests that compile articles and leaks which discredit many 
public figures. The best known ones are Compromat.ru, a compendium about Russian poli-
ticians and businessmen (there were repeated suggestions that the website was founded 
at the inspiration of the Federal Security Service) and Politrash (politrash-ru.livejournal.com).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Data from ComScore, 
November 2011.
All state and local government 
offices have their own websites, 
while blogging and tweeting 
is becoming increasingly popular 
among government officials.
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5. Big Brother watches over the internet
For years, the Russian government has perceived the internet as an important source 
of information, and recently also as a tool for coordinating political initiatives, including 
opposition activity. The government was concerned with the role the web played in the 
organisation of opposition protests in Moldova (2009) and North Africa (2010–2011). 
In December 2011, internet-coordinated protests broke out in Russia following the parlia-
mentary elections. This led several high-ranking Russian officials to publicly express their 
concern about the uncontrolled activity of internet users, and to call for a ‘reasonable regu-
lation of the internet’8. The managements of internet portals and websites were subjected 
to various kinds of pressure. The Federal Security Service ordered the director of Russia’s 
most popular social network VKontakte, Pavel Durov, to close the discussion groups that 
criticised the government and coordinated the organisation of protests. When Durov refused, 
he received a summons to an interrogation at the Prosecutor’s Office. Before the presiden-
tial election this March, the government exerted pressure on the Dozhd online TV station 
and the Ekho Moskvy radio station (which runs a popular website with news and comments).
As in most countries around the world, the Russian government has extensive legal and 
technical instruments for control over the internet. The internet activity is regulated by the 
Civil Code which covers intellectual property, among other issues. The Penal Code also 
covers the activity of internet users (especially Article 282, which prohibits incitement 
to hatred or hostility and degrading human dignity), as well as the law on counteracting 
extremism. On the basis of the aforementioned acts, the Ministry of Justice has created 
a list of materials (including websites) classified as extremist9. Under the law on counteract-
ing extremism, sanctions against individuals have also been applied. In 2008, an internet 
user from Syktyvkar who had expressed controversial statements about policemen in his 
blog received a court sentence. The court ruled that he had incited hatred towards a par-
ticular social group (the police), and sentenced him to one year’s probation.
The Ministry of Communications is the state body authorised to exercise technical control 
over the connections and monitor the internet. The ministry may revoke any internet service 
provider’s license or demand that any website be closed. Roskomnadzor, an agency which 
monitors communications and is subordinate to the Ministry, is responsible for issuing li-
censes for internet service providers, and for monitoring the content of websites to check 
that they comply with the law. If a particular website is considered extremist, Roskom-
nadzor requests the operator to block it. 
The Federal Security Service, whose tasks 
include ‘providing information security’ 
(Articles 8 and 11.2 of the law on the FSS), 
also has extensive powers to monitor 
the activity of internet users. Since 2000, 
the Federal Security Service has oper-
ated the SORM-2 programme (a system 
of technical measures to conduct investi-
gations), under which it can monitor internet and telephone connections without the sanc-
tion of the court; operators are obliged to provide access to lines of communication, other-
wise their licenses may be revoked.
The government also has informal control over Russia’s largest domain registration centre, 
the private company Ru-Center, which is owned by Mikhail Prokhorov, an oligarch affiliated 
with the Kremlin. This control has already been used in the pre-election period. Ru-Center 
announced it would block all domains with illegal content (including incitement to violence, 
extremism and subversion of state power). In February 2012, Ru-Center closed the website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 See the statements by Nikolai 
Patrushev, secretary of the Se-
curity Council, and Prosecutor 
General Yuri Chaika.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 The list of materials which are 
considered to be extremist: 
http://www.minjust.ru/nko/
fedspisok
Since the internet-coordinated waves 
of protests in North Africa (2010– 
–2011) and Russia (2011–2012), 
high-ranking Russian officials have 
expressed their concern about the 
uncontrolled activity of internet users.
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of the Helix centre, which specialised in election monitoring. The government can also block 
users who operate on foreign domains, with the assistance provided by the big global inter-
net companies. First Twitter and then Google introduced the practice of blocking selected 
reports at the request of local authorities, whenever the latter consider that these reports 
violate the law of that particular state.
Apart from activities that are conform to Russian legislation, the opposition activists who op-
erate in cyberspace face actions that run counter to the law, and which are interpreted as 
having been inspired by the government. The purpose of such actions is to discipline or in-
timidate unruly internet users by interfering with their websites and blogs, and signalling that 
their activity (including their private lives) is being monitored. One such form of pressure are 
hacker attacks that paralyse the opposition and independent websites. In recent years, the most 
common type of attack have been DDoS attacks (a distributed denial of service), with multiple 
computers trying to access a given website 
simultaneously. The culmination of such 
attacks occurred in the pre-election year 
of 2011; many websites associated with 
civic and opposition activity were blocked. 
The last large-scale attack took place on 
the parliamentary election day, 4th Decem-
ber 2011. The websites blocked included 
the site of the independent electoral observers Golos (which was planning to post up-to- 
-date information on electoral violations), the popular Slon.ru website (which cooperated 
with Golos in publicising violations), the website run by Ekho Moskvy, the site of the New 
Times weekly, and finally, the Livejournal server, a home to Russian opposition and civil 
activists’ blogs. Opposition bloggers also frequently face trolling, i.e. anonymous users 
posting controversial or incriminating comments, aimed at discrediting the authors of blogs 
or causing conflict among their readers.
Another practice aimed at users who support opposition initiatives on the internet is their 
identification and disclosure of confidential information. For example, personal details of 
people who financially supported Alexei Navalny’s RosPil website via the Yandex-Payments 
portal were leaked in July 2011. Navalny later revealed that the Federal Security Service 
and the Ministry of Interior had requested Yandex for access to this data. Several months 
later, in October 2011, Navalny’s mailbox was hacked and his e-mails of recent years were 
made  public. Russia’s most infamous hacker, nicknamed Hacker Hell, admitted to having 
broken into Navalny’s mailbox; previously Hacker Hell had hacked the mailboxes of several 
other opposition bloggers and commentators, and was accused of acting on the orders of 
the Federal Security Service10. In recent months, wiretapped telephone conversations by 
opposition activists were posted on the net: a few days before a massive opposition rally 
(24 December 2011), the LifeNews portal associated with the government published tel-
ephone conversations by Boris Nemtsov, wherein he spoke critically about other opposition 
leaders. Video recordings from the opposition activists’ homes were also posted on the 
net: in January 2012, a vulgar recording aimed at discrediting another opposition leader, 
Vladimir Ryzhkov, circulated on the web. It is worth stressing that only state investigating 
bodies (with court permission) are authorised to conduct wiretaps in Russia.
The political inspiration behind the hacker attacks and break-ins into the mailboxes of the 
opposition activists is often attributed to the former deputy head of Presidential Adminis-
tration Vladislav Surkov11. Additional information that may confirm this opinion appeared 
in February 2012, when the internet correspondence of Kristina Potupchik (the activist of 
the pro-government youth movement ‘Nashi’) was made public. This time it was Potupchik 
herself who fell victim to the international hacker group Anonymous. The contents of her 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 See http://www.anticompro-
mat.org/gopniki/hellbio.html, 
http://dolboeb.livejournal.
com/2256543.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See http://dolboeb.livejournal.
com/2275327.html i http://
www.anticompromat.org/
raznoe/shevyakbio.html
Opposition activists who are 
active in cyberspace face actions 
that actually violate Russian law, 
and are aimed at disciplining or 
intimidating the unruly internet users.
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mail as disclosed testified that she had coordinated hacker attacks on opposition websites 
and blogs at the request of Yakemenko and Surkov. Officially, the state does not respond 
either to hacker attacks or to allegations that such attacks are politically motivated. After 
scandals caused by attacks on the blogosphere in July 2011 (when the Livejournal server 
was blocked for several days), President Medvedev ordered the law enforcement bodies to 
investigate the case; however, the Interior Ministry concluded that there was no reason to 
initiate such proceedings.
6. Prospects
The Russian government has extensive technical tools to supervise internet activity, and to 
block those initiatives it considers troublesome. However, the main challenge for the govern-
ment is the massive scale of internet activity. It is difficult to effectively monitor and block 
internet users who support the opposition when they number in the millions. In this situa-
tion the government is likely to use selective repressions, targeting the most active blog-
gers and popular online media. Their methods may include economic sanctions (penalties, 
blocking funding) and various forms of provocation (leaking personal information that could 
tarnish the reputation of a given person). 
However, the effectiveness of such actions 
may also be limited. The advanced devel-
opment of the internet makes it possible 
to organise and finance independent activ-
ity online, be it the media or other civil projects. Nor have previous prosecutions of internet 
users proved to be a sufficient scare. The users have not wrapped up their political activity; 
on the contrary, cases of pressure from the state have been publicised, and the victims have 
been provided with support. Therefore, repressive actions on a larger scale could actually 
fuel social resentment and consolidate the public against the government.
The prospects of social and political de-
velopments in the coming years, includ-
ing Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin, 
indicate the worsening conflict between 
the state, which will seek to regulate the 
political, social and information sphere, 
and the ‘internet generation’, who have 
developed attitudes that are contrary to 
the essence of Putin’s system of rule – 
an acceptance of pluralism and free exchange of views, the know-how of organising grass- 
-roots actions. The experience acquired online has already affected the political and social 
realities of Russia, an example of which was the recent mass political protests. There-
fore, even if repression is used against ‘indignant internet users’ after Putin’s return to 
the Kremlin, the government will hardly be able to curb or reverse the civil processes that 
have progressed thanks to the development of the internet.
The main challenge for the government 
is the massive scale of internet activity.
The ‘internet generation’ has developed 
attitudes that are contrary to 
the essence of Putin’s system of rule – 
the acceptance of pluralism 
and the free exchange of views, 
active grass-roots actions.
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CIVIL INITIATIVES IN THE RUNET
RosYama (rosyama.ru), literally ‘a dip in the [Russian] road’ – a portal created by Alexey Navalny, aimed at documenting 
and improving the disastrous state of Russian roads. Internet users from all over Russia post pictures of pits and 
bumps, and the information is sent to the officials responsible for road infrastructure in the given region. Under the 
law, the state bodies are obliged to repair the damages within 37 days.
RosVybory (rosvybory.org), literally ‘Russian elections’ – another project by Alexey Navalny, created before the 2012 
presidential elections. The portal coordinated the activity of independent election observers (registration, training, etc.).
Blue Bucket movement (sineevedro.ru) – another popular civic initiative that concerns roads. This website documents 
the violations of traffic regulations by Russian VIPs, which is an acute social problem, especially in Moscow. The name 
of the movement refers to the special signs of privilege that the elite’s cars are equipped with (flashing blue lights, 
resembling a small bucket, called ‘migalka’ in Russian).
Pomogi.org (Help.org) – a charity portal that helps sick children. For the last seven years the website has collected 192.5 
million roubles (about US$6.5 million) from contributions from internet users, and has financed over 1200 projects.
Russian Fires (russian-fires.ru) – a portal created in the summer of 2010, when Russia was ravaged by a wave of fires. 
The website coordinated assistance for the victims of fires, and was awarded the title of best social site in 2010.
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